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CASE NOTES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-Federal Water Pollution Preven-
tion and Control Act of 1972-Jurisdiction to Review Effluent
Limitation Regulations Promulgated Pursuant to the Act by
Environmental Protection Agency Lies in Circuit Courts. E.l
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975),
cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3585 (U.S. April 19, 1976) (No. 75-978).
Plaintiffs, eight corporations engaged in the manufacture and sale
of chemicals, brought an action against the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) seeking review of certain
regulations' promulgated by the Administrator under the Federal
Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act of 1972 (Act).2 The
district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction on the grounds that only the courts of appeals had juris-
diction to review the regulations.' The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed.'
The Water Pollution Control Act was passed in 1948. ' Its primary
objective was the control of interstate water pollution which endan-
gered the health or welfare of persons in states adjoining those where
pollutants were discharged. Responsibility for the restriction of pol-
lutants lay primarily with the states.' Federal enforcement was
available only after an elaborate procedure of public hearings before
a hearing board which would recommend whether or not federal
officials should bring a federal suit to secure abatement of the pollu-
tion.7 The Act was amended in 19561 and 1965,1 but the amendments
did nothing to change the basic scheme of the statute. Thus, federal
1. 40 C.F.R. pt. 415 (1975). The provisions applicable to discharges resulting from the
production of sulfuric acid are codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 415.210-16 (1975).
2. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 31, 33
U.S.C.).
3. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 383 F. Supp. 1244 (W.D. Va. 1974), aff'd,
528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3585 (U.S. April 19, 1976) (No. 75-
978).
4. 528 F.2d at 1142.
5. Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155.
6. Brief for Respondent EPA at 6, E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, No. 74-1261
(4th Cir. March 10, 1976).
7. Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, § 2(d), 62 Stat. 1155.
8. Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-660, 70 Stat. 498.
9. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903.
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intervention to secure the abatement of pollution could take place
only after an elaborate conference and hearing procedure similar to
that created by the 1948 Act. In 1970 further amendments'" regu-
lated the discharge of oil and other hazardous substances into navig-
able waters through a federally administered permit program; but
again, the scope and mechanical operation of the Act made direct
federal control of pollution onerous.
The present Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act
was passed in 1972 with the purpose of (1) promoting a shift in
emphasis in the Act's policy from regulation of the quality of bodies
of water to regulation of effluents discharged into the water, and (2)
making clear the important function of the states by recognizing
that they possessed the primary responsibility to prevent, reduce,
and eliminate pollution of navigable waters." The Act also created
a "permit" granting plan which provides for state participation in
applying both the Act and EPA regulations.
The issuance of permits for the discharge of pollutants is governed
by section 402 of the Act. 2 The states may grant such permits where
the applicant's facility complies with sections 301 and 304 of the Act
which prescribe effluent limitations.
Section 301 sets out the policy of the Act in the context of a
general prohibition of all effluent discharges, except as provided by
law.'" It then establishes a timetable for the "achievement" of ef-
fluent limitations, but contains no express mandate as to who is to
achieve them. Section 301 does provide that effluent limitations are
to be determined in accordance with effluent limitation "guide-
lines," issued in the form of regulations under section 304(b).'4
10. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84
Stat. 91.
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. IV, 1974).
12. Id. § 1342.
13. Section 301 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as in compliance with this section and sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402,
and 404 of this Act [33 U.S.C. §§ 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, 1344 (Supp. IV, 1974)]
the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.
(b) In order to carry out the objective of this Act there shall be achieved -
(1)(A) not later than July 1, 1977, effluent limitations for point sources, other than
publicly owned treatment works . ...
33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. IV, 1974).
14. Section 304 provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1) The Administrator . . . shall develop and publish . . . criteria for water qual-
ity . . . .
(b) For the purpose of adopting or revising effluent limitations under this Act the
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Thus, the guidelines established under section 304(b) are an impor-
tant step in the attainment of the statutory objectives announced
by section 301.
Actions of the EPA Administrator taken under sections 301 and
402 are expressly reviewable in the court of appeals.'5 But the stat-
ute conferring this jurisdiction, section 509, is silent as to which
court has jurisdiction to review actions of the Administrator taken
under section 304(b).' 6 ,
In order to determine the absence or existence of subject matter
jurisdiction, 7 the DuPont court was required to determine whether
the Administrator's authority to promulgate effluent limitation reg-
ulations is derived, at least in part, from section 301.'1 If he has such
authority under section 301, the Administrator can set absolute
effluent limitations. 9 If he does not have such authority, the states,
in their capacity as issuers of effluent discharge permits under sec-
tion 402, will establish effluent limitations for individual permit
applicants as part of the permit-issuing process.' Those state-
Administrator shall . . . publish . . . regulations, providing guidelines for effluent
limitations . . . Such regulations shall . . . (2)(B) specify factors to be taken into
account in determining the best measures and practives available to comply with
subsection (b)(2) of section 301 of this Act [33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. IV, 1974)] ....
33 U.S.C. § 1314 (Supp. IV, 1974).
15. Section 509(b)(1) provides:
Review of the Administrator's action (A) in promulgating any standard of performance
under section 306 [33 U.S.C. § 1316 (Supp. IV, 1974)], (B) in making any determina-
tion pursuant to section 306(b)(1)(C), (C) in promulgating any effluent standard,
prohibition, or treatment standard under section 307 [33 U.S.C. § 1317], (D) in
making any determination as to a State permit program submitted under section
402(b) [33 U.S.C. § 1342], (E) in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation
or other limitation under section 301 [33 U.S.C. § 1311], 302 [33 U.S.C. § 13121, or
306, and (F) in issuing or denying any permit under section 402, may be had by any
interested person in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States for the Federal
judicial district in which such person resides or transacts such business upon applica-
tion by such person. Any such application shall be made within ninety days from the
date of such determination, approval, promulgation, issuance or denial, or after such
date only if such application is based solely on grounds which arose after such ninetieth
day.
33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974). In addition to the states which qualify to issue
effluent discharge permits, the Administrator has the authority to issue such permits under
section 402 [33 U.S.C. § 1342].
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (Supp. IV, 1974).
17. 528 F.2d at 1137.
18. Id. at 1142.
19. American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1035 (3d Cir. 1975).
20. Id. at 1035-36.
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established limitations will be based on effluent limitation guide-
lines promulgated by the Administrator under section 304, and not
on EPA regulations issued under section 301 which prescribe actual
effluent limitations. 21
Other circuit courts have ruled on this issue prior to DuPont. In
CPC International Inc. v. Train22 plaintiffs, manufacturers of corn
products, sought review of the same regulations that were before the
court in Dupont. The controversy focused on the relationship be-
tween section 301 and the effluent limitation guidelines for existing
plants promulgated under section 304(b). The Administrator argued
that the contested regulations were promulgated under both section
301(b) and section 304(b). 23 The Eighth Circuit concluded that the
Act did not grant the Administrator any "separate power under §
301 to promulgate by regulation effluent limitations for existing
sources."
2 4
The court's analysis of the statutory construction issue com-
menced with the observation that section 301 made no provision for
EPA promulgation of effluent limitations by regulation.25 Since spe-
cific provisions for promulgation of other regulations were expressly
set out elsewhere in the Act, the failure of Congress to include such
a provision in section 301 was not oversight, particularly in view of
the unambiguous language in these sections.26 The court also noted
the specificity with which the Act spells out the procedures for
promulgation and enforcement of regulations, and the fact that is-
suance of permits pursuant to the permit granting program estab-
lished by section 402(d)(2) is clearly governed by guidelines promul-
gated under section 304(b). 27
The court found support for its conclusion that effluent limita-
tions were to be achieved under the section 402 permit program, and
not by promulgation of separate regulations issued under section
301, in the legislative history of the Act. A statement made in testi-
mony before the Senate subcommittee considering the Act by then
21. 528 F.2d at 1139.
22. 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975).
23. Id. at 1037.
24. Id. (footnote omitted).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1038. As examples the court cited §§ 306(b)(1)(B), 307(a)(2), (b), (c) of the Act,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1316(b)(1)(B), 1317(a)(2), (b), (c) (Supp. IV. 1974).
27. Id. at 1038.
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EPA administrator William Ruckelshaus was particularly persua-
sive.2 Ruckelshaus' testimony indicated his understanding that
effluent limitations would be established as part of the permit-
issuing process:29
[W]e believe that such Federal guidance is especially important in the area
of effluent limitations. This concept is new in the law. It would be difficult
and needlessly duplicative for each State to gather all the scientific, in-
dustrial, and technological information upon which effluent limitations must
be based. Federal leadership must be provided here so that the States, in
setting effluent limitations, have a clear idea of the task.
The Eighth Circuit also noted a statement' of Representatives
Abzug and Rangel which was attached to the Report on the House
version of the bill." The statement argued for nationally promul-
gated effluent limitations standards from existing point sources,
and criticized the absence in the original version of the bill of any
provision for federal review of state permits under section 402.32 The
CPC court thus confidently concluded that the Administrator had
no authority to promulgate effluent limitation regulations under
section 301 of the Act, and that his actions were taken by virtue of
the authority conferred by section 304.1
The other courts of appeals which have ruled on the authority of
the Administrator to promulgate effluent limitation regulations
under section 301 have reached results consistent with the holding
in DuPont. In American Iron and Steel Institute v. EPA4 the Third
Circuit reconciled the clear Congressional intent that the states
28. Id. at 1039-40.
29. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on
Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. H9, pt. 1, at 19 (1971).
30. 515 F.2d at 1041.
31. H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC
WORKS, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CON-
TROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 871 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY].
32. [T~he bill should give EPA authority
(a) to review all permit applications; and
(b) to prevent the issuance of any permit to which it objects.
Further, the bill should require that EPA withdraw approval of any state permit
program which is not being administered in accordance with the law and conditions
of approval.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 871.
33. 515 F.2d at 1037.
34. 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975).
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have discretion in issuing permits with the promulgation of absolute
effluent limitations by requiring that effluent limitations prescribed
by the Administrator not be exceeded:"5
[T]he section 301 limitations represent both the base level or minimum
degree of effluent control permissible and the ceiling (or maximum amount
of effluent discharge) permissible nationwide within a given category, and
the section 304 guidelines are intended to provide precise guidance to the
permit-issuing authorities in establishing a permissible level of discharge
that is more stringent than the ceiling.
Moreover, the court recognized the particular competency of the
EPA to construe and administer the Act, saying that "where an Act
of Congress is fairly susceptible of differing constructions, the inter-
pretation made of it by the agency charged with its administration
should be given considerable deference. '36
In attempting to resolve pronounced inconsistencies in the legisla-
tive history of the Act, the American Iron court relied heavily on
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council,37 where the Supreme
Court stated that the interpretation of an ambiguous statute by the
administrative agency charged with its enforcement should be ac-
corded significant weight in judicial resolution of the issues in
dispute. The Supreme Court announced its confidence in the abil-
ity of the EPA to formulate a construction of the Clean Air Act
which was "sufficiently reasonable to preclude the Court of Appeals
from substituting its judgment for that of the Agency."39 While the
Court did not suggest that EPA's construction of the Clean Air Act
was the only one that could be arrived at, it did hold that the
interpretation was reasonable enough "that it should have been
accepted by the reviewing courts."4
American Meat Institute v. EPA4' contains the most persuasive
analysis of the legislative history of the Act. The Seventh Circuit
noted that comments of Senator Bentsen, a member of the Senate
Public Works Committee which reported out the original version of
35. Id. at 1045.
36. Id. at 1041.
37. 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
38. Id. at 87.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 75.
41. 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975).
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the Act,4" clearly indicated that the Administrator was intended to
promulgate regulations under section 301.11 Similar intent was
found in the Senate Report on the Act.4 The court also pointed to
Senator Muskie's written explanation of the Act to the Senate dur-
ing debate on the conference report, in which he made clear that
broad discretion to fix permissible effluent levels was not to rest
with the states." The factors to be considered in determining the
level of effluent discharge were for the discretion of the Administra-
tor and were not to be considered on a plant by plant basis at the
time of application for a permit. Muskie also stated that nationally
uniform effluent limitations would be promulgated as a result of the
Act."
In accounting for the disparity in various interpretations which
have flowed from analyses of the legislative history and in deference
to the Eighth Circuit's analysis in CPC, the American Meat court
noted that "[m]uch of the remaining legislative history . .. is
ambiguous," due largely to the unclear definition of "effluent limi-
tation" offered by section 502(11)." 7 Since the court took the position
that the question before it was "not whether the agency's interpreta-
tion of § 301 [was] the only permissible one, but rather [was it]
sufficiently reasonable to preclude [the court] from substituting
[its] judgment for that of the agency,"4 it deemed the multiplica-
tion of examples from the legislative history to be unnecessary.
The only significant difference in analysis among the courts re-
viewing the regulations has been the DuPont court's conclusion that
it did not have to decide whether section 301 alone authorized the
promulgation of effluent limitations in order to determine that juris-
42. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., (1972), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1283.
43. 526 F.2d at 451.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 172.
47. 526 F.2d at 452.
Section 502(11) provides:
The term 'effluent limitation' means any restriction established by a State or the
Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biologi-
cal, and other constituents which are discharged from point sources into navigable
waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, or the ocean, including schedules of compli-
ance.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (Supp. IV, 1974) (emphasis added).
48. 526 F.2d at 449-50 (footnote omitted).
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diction to review the regulations was in the court of appeals under
section 509.11 It viewed EPA actions taken under section 304(b) as
the starting point of the Administrator's authority to promulgate
effluent limitations and held that "any action taken by the Admin-
istrator under § 304(b) should properly be considered to be pursuant
to the provisions of § 301 and, therefore, reviewable by this court
under § 509."10
When the Supreme Court reviews DuPont, resolution of the juris-
diction issue will probably require an analysis of the Administrator's
authority to issue effluent limitations regulations under section 301.
On this score, the summary manner in which the DuPont court
decided that it made no difference whether the Administrator had
such authority' seems somewhat cavalier in light of the other deci-
sions which have considered the question. In this respect, the dis-
trict court's opinion is much stronger."
There is a tension in the policy of the Act which makes determina-
tion of whether the Administrator has authority to promulgate
effluent limitations pursuant to section 301 difficult to resolve. On
one hand, it was the intention of Congress to draw the states into
active administration of the Act. The primary vehicle for this par-
ticipation is the section 402 permit program. At the same time, the
scheme created by the Act is pervasive and requires vast federal
input. It is unlikely that Congress intended that fifty sovereigns
49. 528 F.2d at 1139. On March 10, 1976 the Fourth Circuit handed down three decisions
in which it addressed the technical adequacy of particular effluent limitation regulations. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, No. 74-1261 (4th Cir. March 10, 1976) was the resolution
of the merits in the consolidated proceedings involved in the jurisdictional dispute decided
by the subject case. The court found that the Administrator had the authority to promulgate
regulations prescribing effluent limitations pursuant to section 301. No. 74-1261, at 16. The
court therefore resolved the issue of whether the EPA or the state permit issuers are to issue
effluent limitations under the scheme contemplated by the Act in favor of federal authority.
This was the issue that the court considered unnecessary to decide in considering the
jurisdictional question. 528 F.2d at 1138.
The other two decisions were FMC Corp. v. Train, No. 74-1386 (4th Cir. March 10, 1976)
and Tanners' Council of America, Inc. v. Train, No. 74-1740 (4th Cir. March 10, 1976) in
which the court disposed of petitions to review for the Plastics and Synthetics Point Source
Category and the Leather Tanning and Finishing Industry Point Source Category, respec-
tively. In each case the court noted that the Administrator had authority to promulgate
effluent limitation regulations pursuant to section 301 of the Act, and cited its decision in
No. 74-1261 as authority for that proposition.
50. 528 F.2d at 1142.
51. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
52. 383 F. Supp. 1244 (W.D. Va. 1974).
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create their own standards for the control of industrial water
pollution; 3 the objectives of the Act are more efficiently and
economically attainable through federal action.
As a matter of bare statutory construction, the silence of section
301 as to who is to achieve effluent limitations appears to be legisla-
tive oversight. Still, the interpretation offered by the DuPont court
is feasible. It is unlikely that the authority to issue "guidelines,"
conferred by section 304(b) of the Act, would be separated from the
authority to issue section 301 effluent limitations. As to the jurisdic-
tional issue, the DuPont court was wise in rejecting a view that
would result in judicial review in the scattered manner suggested by
the plaintiffs.
The result of the confusion surrounding the question of authority
to issue effluent limitations has been uncertainty and delay in the
implementation of a scheme to cope with a serious national prob-
lem. During the pendency of the appeal in DuPont, the EPA sug-
gested that the actions .of the chemical companies amounted to
nothing more than an attempt to undermine the Congressional plan
set up by the Act for coping with industrial water pollution.54
In their petition for certiorari, plaintiff chemical companies sug-
gested that the reason for the conflict among the circuits is the
manner in which the effluent limitations regulations have been at-
tacked in each case.5 They further suggest that the jurisdictional
question has not been raised squarely and uniformly by plaintiffs in
each of the cases, and that in two of them it was not raised by the
plaintiffs at all. 6 But it does seem clear that the Supreme Court will
53. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 871.
54. Brief for Respondent at 31, E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, No. 74-1261 (4th
Cir. March 10, 1976).
55. Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 16, E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 44
U.S.L.W. 3441 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1976) (No. 75-978). Another court of appeals which has consid-
ered the jurisdictional issue is the Tenth Circuit. In American Petroleum Institute v. Train,
526 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1975) the court held that it had exclusive jurisdiction to review
effluent limitation regulations. The court said that the authority of the EPA Administrator
to issue the regulations under section 301 was not in issue, and that since the Administrator
purported to act under the section, the regulations were clearly drawn into the jurisdictional
grant of section 509. The court declined to consider the statutory power of the Administrator
and found that for the purpose of the proceeding before it (which considered only the
jurisdictional issue), the Administrator's claim that the regulations were promulgated under
§ 301 of the Act was dispositive. Id. at 1345-46.
56. American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975); American
Meat Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975).
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have to decide the question of the Administrator's authority to issue
effluent limitations pursuant to section 301 of the Act before the
collateral issues of technical adequacy of the regulations, the
function of state permit issuing agencies, and the jurisdictional
question can be resolved.
James C. McMahon, Jr.
